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Royal H. Brin, Jr. *
I. AUTOMOBILE AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
Uninsured Motorist Coverage. Uninsured motorist coverage was an area of
comparatively little judicial activity during this reporting period. In Francis v.
International Service Insurance Co. I the court of civil appeals upheld a policy
definition of "uninsured automobile" which excluded from coverage vehi-
cles owned by governmental agencies. Francis was seriously injured in a
collision between an uninsured fire truck owned by the City of Grand Prairie,
Texas, and the automobile in which she was a passenger. She sought coverage
for her injuries under the uninsured automobile portion of the Family
Automobile Policy issued to the owner of the vehicle in which she was riding
when the accident occurred. International, the insurer of the automobile she
was occupying, denied coverage on the ground that the fire truck was not an
"uninsured automobile" within the language of the policy. 2 The trial court
granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, and Francis appealed on
the ground that the insurance policy's definition of "uninsured automobile"
was contrary to public policy and violated the terms of the Texas Uninsured
Motorist Statute. 3 The policy language in question, which expressly excluded
* B.A., J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,Texas. The author gratefully
acknowledges the very considerable assistance of Duncan L. Clore in the preparation of this
Article.
1. 533 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, writ granted).
2. The policy defined "uninsured automobile," in part, as follows:
(a) an automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, maintenance or use of
which there is, in at least the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law
of the state in which the insured automobile is principally garaged, no bodily
injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with
respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such
automobile, or with respect to which there is a bodily injury liability bond or
insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing
the same denies coverage thereunder, ... but the term 'uninsured automobile'
shall not include:
(3) an automobile or trailer owned by the United States of America, Canada, a
state, a political subdivision of any such government or an agency of any of the
foregoing.
Id. at 409-10.
3. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 5.06-1 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). This statute provides in part:
(1) No automobile liability insurance (including insurance issued pursuant to
an Assigned Risk Plan established under authority of Section 35 of the Texas
Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility Act), covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued
for delivery in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental
thereto, in the limits described in the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
Act, under provisions prescribed by the Board, for the protection of persons
insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom. The coverage required under this
Article shall not be applicable where any insured named in the policy shall reject
the coverage; and provided further, that unless the named insured requests such
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governmental vehicles from uninsured motorist coverage, had been approved
by the State Board of Insurance in accordance with its authority under the
Texas uninsured motorist statute, article 5.06-1 of the Insurance Code.
Francis contended that the policy definition frustrated the intent and purpose
of the statute which was to benefit the victim of financially irresponsible
motorists.
The Texarkana court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, noting that the statute is unequivocal, empowers the Board to formu-
late a definition of uninsured automobile, and expressly authorizes the Board
to exclude from such definition vehicles whose operators are, in fact,
uninsured. The court applied the clear language of the statute, commenting
that the constitutionality of the Board's authority to promulgate forms and to
define uninsured motor vehicles was settled.' The definition in question was
found to be consistent with the recognized purpose of the statute, although
the court noted that by approving such language the State Board of Insurance
had clearly restricted the statute's possible scope. Nevertheless, since the
language of the statute was clear and the definition did not go beyond
statutory limits, the court held that the definition was valid. As of this writing,
writ has been granted by the supreme court to decide whether a policy
definition of uninsured automobile which excludes vehicles belonging to
governmental agencies is valid .
A standard provision in many policies which excludes uninsured motorist
coverage if the insured "shall, without written consent of the company, make
any settlement with any person or organization who may be legally liable
therefor" was again upheld in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Ford.6 The stipulated facts of the case followed the same basic scenario
established in recent cases interpreting this policy provision as reported in the
last Survey. 7 Joan Ford was killed while a passenger in Harvey's automobile
in a collision with Whitten, an uninsured motorist whose negligence caused
the accident. The Harvey automobile was insured by Gulf Insurance Com-
pany under a policy that included uninsured motorist coverage. Robert Ford,
the legal guardian of the three surviving children of Joan Ford, was insured by
State Farm under an automobile liability policy containing the same standard
uninsured motorist coverage. Robert Ford, in his individual capacity and as
guardian of the minor children, brought suit against State Farm and Gulf for
coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a
renewal policy where the named insured has rejected the coverage in connection
with a policy previously issued to him by the same insurer.
(2) For the purpose of this coverage, the term 'uninsured motor vehicle' shall,
subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed to include an
insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is unable to make
payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified
therein because of insolvency. The State Board of Insurance is hereby authorized
to promulgate the forms of the uninsured motorist coverage. The Board may also,
in such forms, define 'uninsured motor vehicle' to exclude certain motor vehicles
whose operators are in fact uninsured.
4. 533 S.W.2d at 410. The court cited Hamaker v. American States Ins. Co., 493 S.W.2d 893
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
5. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 310 (May 15, 1976).
6. 537 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ granted).
7. Brin, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 195, 196-97 (1976).
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the benefits of each of the policies. Gulf subsequently settled with Ford by an
agreed judgment entered into without the consent of State Farm. The trial
court then entered judgment against State Farm, who appealed. The court of
civil appeals was of the opinion that the case was controlled by prior Texas
decisions on the subject8 and held that the agreed judgment was a settlement
with one "who may be legally liable" for plaintiff's injuries, thereby dis-
charging State Farm from any liability. On October 16, 1976, the Texas
Supreme Court granted writ of error in the case on the sole point of whether or
not plaintiff's settlement with Gulf under a release/trust agreement released
any organization or person who may have been legally liable to Ford. 9 The
court of civil appeals opinion made no mention of the particulars of Ford's
settlement with Gulf, apparently on the assumption that the settlement was a
complete release of Gulf without State Farm's consent. It would appear,
however, that if Gulf was, in fact, not released by Ford's settlement, as
assumed by the court, the policy provision would be inapplicable and would
not have barred Ford's recovery against State Farm.
The effectiveness of a written rejection by the insured of uninsured
motorist coverage where an original policy was assumed by a second insurer
and a renewal policy was subsequently issued without uninsured motorist
coverage was treated in Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Boggs. 1o Boggs had been
issued an automobile liability insurance policy by First National in which he
had specifically rejected uninsured motorist coverage. During the term of the
policy in question the policies of First National were assumed by Guarantee.
At the expiration of the policy term Boggs requested renewal of the policy
without requesting the addition of uninsured motorist coverage or mentioning
any other change in policy coverage. The Texas uninsured motorist statute
requires a written request for uninsured motorist coverage from the insured
where such coverage has been rejected in connection with a policy previously
issued to him by the same insurer." In a case of first impression the court of
civil appeals held that the words "policy previously issued to him by the same
insurer" must be accorded their literal meaning and referred only to a policy
previously issued by the same business entity. Because First National and
Guarantee were separate business entities, the court reasoned that the
insurance policy renewed by Guarantee, although identical with the original
policy, was not a renewal by the same insurer within the meaning of the
statute. Therefore, by operation of law, uninsured motorist coverage was
included in the renewal policy. 2
8. The court considered the case to be controlled by Castorena v. Employers Cas. Co., 526
S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); McClelland v. United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 525 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd); Jessie v. Security Mut. Cas.
Co., 488 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grissom v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a
discussion of these cases see Brin, supra note 7, at 196-97.
9. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 9 (Oct. 16, 1976).
10. 527 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ dism'd).
11. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); see note 3 supra.
12. Article 5.06-1 provides that uninsured motorist coverage shall be provided in all
automobile liability policies unless the insured expressly rejects such coverage.
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Allen v. A very' 3 reaffirmed the right of the insurer to settle with its insured
for uninsured motorist coverage under its policy and then to defend him
against a damage action instituted by the heirs of the uninsured motorist. In a
suit filed against the insured plaintiffs, heirs of the uninsured motorist, con-
tended that the insurer could not both settle with its insured and defend him in
an action involving the same accident, for to do so involved a conflict of
interest on the part of the insurer. Following the decision approved by the
supreme court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hunt, 14 the court of civil appeals
held that no conflict of interest was presented since such action did not
constitute dual representation of both the insured and the uninsured motorist
and, in fact, merely reflected the insurer's duty to defend the interest of its
insured.
Persons Insured. Republic Insurance Co. v. Luna 5 dealt with the term
"permission of the owner" in an automobile liability policy. The policy
provided coverage to the insured and his family while driving a non-owned
vehicle if permission of the owner was obtained or the responsible driver
reasonably believed he had the permission of the owner to operate the
automobile. Nowhere in the policy was "owner" defined. Luna, the in-
sured's son, was involved in a collision while driving a car borrowed from
Stacha, a college friend. Stacha, Sr., the owner, had bought the car as a
graduation present for young Stacha to use at college with instructions not to
allow others to use the car. Luna had driven the car previously with young
Stacha's permission and was unaware that the car actually belonged to
Stacha, Sr. The insurer brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to be
excused from defending Luna on the ground Luna did not have permission,
nor could he reasonably have believed he had the permission of the owner.
The trial court held against the insurer, who appealed. The court of civil
appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the term "owner" was synony-
mous with "holder" or "possessor" and construed the policy language
against the insurer, stating that to hold otherwise would place an unrealistic
burden on the insured to ascertain the true owner of the insured vehicle.
Exclusions. Travelors Indemnity Co. v. Cen-Texas Vending Co. 16 involved
the interpretation of an employee exclusion clause in a policy of automobile
insurance. Under the stipulated facts Angerstein, an employee of Cen-Tex,
was injured in the course of his employment in an automobile accident while
driving a vehicle owned by Cen-Tex. Angerstein was an "additional driver"
under the policy issued by Travelers and was not covered by workmen's
compensation. Cen-Tex and Angerstein sued Travelers for Angerstein's
medical expenses under the medical payments portion of the policy. The
policy, however, excluded recovery for "bodily injury to. . .any employee
13. 537 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
14. 450 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970), aff'd, 469 S.W.2d 151
(Tex. 1971).
15. 539 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
16. 530 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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of the named insured . . . arising out of and in the course of (1) domestic
employment by the named insured. . . if benefits therefore are in whole or in
part either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compen-
sation law, or (2) other employment by the named insured. . . . ",17 The trial
court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The court of civil appeals reversed
and rendered judgment for the insurer, holding that Angerstein's medical
expenses were expressly excluded by the clear language of the policy. Since
Angerstein was not a domestic employee he fell within the category of "other
employment by the named insured," and was expressly excluded from
recovering for the injuries he sustained in the course of his employment.
The judgment of the court of civil appeals in Ramsay v. Maryland Ameri-
can General Insurance Co. ,18 discussed in the last Survey, 9 was reversed by
the supreme court. As will be recalled, Ramsay involved the interesting
question of whether a United States Navy-owned truck, used exclusively for
non-profit activities of the United States Government, was a "commercial
automobile." Ramsay, a civilian employed by the Navy as an air conditioning
mechanic, was killed while operating a Navy-owned pickup truck on a public
highway. Mrs. Ramsay sued Maryland American for death benefits under a
combination automobile policy endorsement which excluded coverage for
"bodily injury or death sustained in the course of his occupation by any
person while engaged (1) in duties incident to the operation, loading or
unloading of, or as an assistant on, a public or livery conveyance or commer-
cial automobile .. ."20 The trial court found for the plaintiff, which judg-
ment was reversed and rendered for the insurer by the court of civil appeals.
In so holding, the court of civil appeals was of the opinion that Ramsay,
whose duty it was to install, repair, and service air conditioning equipment for
the Navy, was engaged in commerce, though his employer was not; therefore,
the pickup was a commercial automobile within the terms of the policy
exclusion. The supreme court, unpersuaded by this analysis, reversed the
court of civil appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Acknow-
ledging that the term "commercial automobile" would under ordinary cir-
cumstances be unambiguous, the supreme court reasoned that, when applied
to a Navy-owned truck used exclusively for non-profit activities of the United
States Government, the term was no longer certain and, therefore, under
well-established principles such ambiguity must be construed against the
insurer.
Shillings v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. 21 involved the terms
"collision" and "incidental loss or damage due to operation of the equip-
ment" in an inland marine policy. A caterpillar tractor used for clearing land
was damaged when a tree being cut by driving the tractor blade into the side of
the tree accidentally fell on the tractor. Plaintiffs brought suit against the
insurer for damage to the tractor under an endorsement entitled "Contractors
17. Id. at 355.
18. 533 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1976).
19. Brin, supra note 7, at 199.
20. 533 S.W.2d at 346.
21. 536 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Equipment Form" which provided coverage for loss or damage by collision,
landslide, or upset but which excluded "incidental loss or damage due to
operation of equipment." 22 The terms "collision" and "incidental loss or
damage due to operation of equipment" were not defined in the policy.
Plaintiffs recovered at trial but the court of civil appeals reversed and
rendered judgment for the insured. Finding no Texas authority directly in
point, the court examined analogous cases in other jurisdictions and con-
cluded that the term "collision," when broadly construed, included impact of
the tractor with the tree. The policy exclusion for "incidental loss or damage
due to operation of the equipment" was considered ambiguous; therefore, by
operation of law the ambiguity was resolved in favor of the insured.
Notice. The court of civil appeals upheld as sufficient a policy term providing
for cancellation of an automobile liability policy by proper mailing of notice in
Rhymes v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.23 Acknowledging the supreme court's
opinion in Sudduth v. Commonwealth County Mutual Insurance Co.24 which
upheld an identical provision in another policy, the court reaffirmed the
majority rule that a policy can be cancelled by the proper mailing of notice in
accordance with policy terms even though the notice is never actually
received by the policyholder.
Aircraft Hull & Liability Insurance. Two cases dealt with the coverage
provisions of aircraft hull and liability policies. Vanguard Insurance Co. v.
Plains Helicopter, Inc. 25 was a declaratory judgment action brought by the
insurer to determine whether its aircraft hull and liability policy provided
coverage for a helicopter crash which occurred after completion of crop
spraying operations. The policy in question insured the helicopter except
"while . . . used for crop dusting or spraying operations." 26 The helicopter
crashed while attempting to land on the back of a nurse truck for refueling
upon completion of the day's potato crop spraying. The insurer contended
that an integral part of the spraying operations was being conducted at the
time of the crash and, thereby, excluded the loss from coverage. The.policy
did not define the term "operations" or otherwise prescribe criteria for
determining when operations ceased. The trial court found coverage, and the
court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that the word "operations," in the
absence of a policy definition, must be accorded its ordinary meaning of
work; and since no further work remained to be done once the potato crop
spraying had been completed, the helicopter was not engaged in crop dusting
or spraying operations at the time of the crash. In the court's view the fact that
the crash occurred while the helicopter was attempting to land on the nurse
truck which had been used as an integral part of the spraying operations did
not justify a holding that crop spraying operations had not ceased.
In National Insurance Underwriters v. Glover27 a declaratory judgment
22. Id. at 628.
23. 533 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
24. 454 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1970).
25. 529 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
26. Id. at 278.
27. 535 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ granted).
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action was brought by National to determine coverage under its aviation
liability policy following a suit by survivors of the deceased passengers of an
airplane crash. The plane had crashed in inclement weather conditions for
which the insured pilot was not properly rated to fly the aircraft. Rogers, the
insured pilot, had a private pilot's license which permitted him to fly only
under visual flight rules (VFR) and did not authorize flight under instrument
flight rules (IFR). On the day in question Rogers had contacted the appro-
priate FAA Flight Service Station for a weather briefing prior to the planned
flight from Odessa to Eagle Pass. IFR weather conditions existed at Odessa
and along the proposed route at the time of the weather briefing. By take-off,
weather conditions had sufficiently improved at Odessa ti permit a VFR
take-off, although weather conditions along the proposed route remained
IFR. Under the agreed statement of facts, approximately the first one-third of
the flight was in VFR conditions, the next one-third was in probable IFR
conditions, while the last one-third was in definite IFR conditions. The parties
stipulated that Rogers was negligent in flying into known weather conditions
which required an instrument pilot rating. The policy excluded coverage
whenever the pilot operating the aircraft was not "properly rated" for the
flight in question. The trial court held that as a matter of law there was
coverage. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the
insurer, holding that where the pilot commenced his flight knowing that the
weather conditions enroute to his destination did not permit VFR flight he
was not "properly rated" for the flight and thereby was precluded from
policy coverage. Chief Justice Preslar, writing a vigorous dissent, would have
upheld coverage on the premise that Rogers was not in violation of his pilot
rating at the time of the crash. Although Rogers knowingly flew the aircraft
into IFR weather the evidence indicated that he was attempting to fly visually
by hugging the ground. Although he was clearly in violation of visual flight
regulations he was not in violation of his pilot rating since he was not
attempting instrument flight; thus, the dissent reasoned, there was coverage.
On July 3, 1976, the Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error on the single
point that the court of civil appeals erred in holding that Rogers was not
"properly rated for the flight" in question. 2 On January 12, 1977, the
supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. 29 The court found that the words "in flight" in the pilot
clause were ambiguous and could be construed as either visual or instrument
flight as Justice Preslar had argued in his dissent. 3' The court then applied the
rule that exceptions and rules of limitation are to be strictly construed against
the insurer31 and held that there was coverage.12
28. 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 367 (July 3, 1976).
29. Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 150 (Jan. 12, 1977).
30. Id. at 154.
31. The rule was set forth in Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren, 52 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762
(Tex. 1953).
32. The court noted:
Our holding may seem harsh to the insurer because we have held this insurance
policy applicable even though it is undisputed that the non-instrument rated pilot
was flying in IFR conditions when the crash occurred. We note that our
construction of this pilot clause was necessary, however, only because National
1977]
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An insurer was held bound by a consent judgment entered against its
insured after it had been offered the defense of the suit in Ranger Insurance
Co. v. Rogers. 33 Plaintiff had filed actions against the estate of Rogers, the
insured pilot, for the death of her husband in the crash of a light plane in a west
Texas dust storm. The insurer was offered the defense of the suit by the
administrator of Rogers' estate, but it asserted a policy defense and refused to
defend the suit without a "reservation of rights" agreement which the
administrator refused to grant. A consent judgment was subsequently entered
by a federal district court in the death action, approving a settlement made by
the parties. Thereafter, plaintiff and the administrator of Rogers' estate filed
suit against the insurer, alleging coverage under the aviation liability policy.
Affirming the judgment of the trial court, the court of civil appeals held that
having refused defense of the suit, the insurer could not be regarded as a
stranger to the consent judgment and was bound by its terms. Thus, relitiga-
tion of the liability and damage questions previously decided in the action
against the pilot's estate was precluded.
Personal Injury Protection Coverage. Berry v. Dairyland County Mutual
Insurance Co. 34 dealt with the question of whether an injury received by an
insured while alighting from an automobile was covered by "personal injury
protection" coverage contained in an automobile liability policy. Plaintiff
sued Dairyland, seeking to recover upon the "personal injury protection"
coverage of his insurance policy for injuries sustained when he twisted his
right knee while getting out of his parked car. As a result of the injury plaintiff
was hospitalized, underwent knee surgery, and suffered lost wages. The
insurer argued that plaintiff's injury was not a "bodily injury caused by
accident, in a motor vehicle accident" within the terms of personal injury
protection coverage in Dairyland's policy. On appeal the court of civil appeals
reversed and rendered judgment for the insured, holding that article 5.06-3 of
the Texas Insurance Code 3' did not purport to restrict the type of accident to
which personal injury protection applied to injuries sustained in a "motor
vehicle accident." Since the statute simply states that coverage shall be
afforded for losses "arising from the accident," or "as a result of the
accident," any provision of the insurance policy contrary to the statute is
void. The court reasoned that since the accident sustained by the insured
occurred while he was "occupying" the vehicle, it was an accident within the
meaning of the statute and was covered by "personal injury protection." If
the policy language in question was contrary to article 5.06-3, it would be read
to conform to the statute.
chose to phrase the insurance policy in the ambiguous manner heretofore
discussed. Language was available to, and known to, National which would have
clearly and plainly excluded from coverage a non-instrument rated pilot who
operated his aircraft in IFR conditions.
20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 155-56.
33. 530 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
34. 534 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
35. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
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Stowers Doctrine. An interesting twist to the Stowers36 doctrine occurred in
Samford v. Allstate Insurance Co. 37 Plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the
insured, sued Allstate in an attempt to proceed directly against the insurance
carrier for the excess judgment granted as a result of the insurer's alleged
negligence in failing to exercise ordinary care in the settlement of the
plaintiffs' suit against the insured. Plaintiffs contended that the insured had
failed to assert his cause of action against the insurer and that they were
third-party beneficiaries of such a cause of action. The trial court granted the
insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of civil appeals affirmed,
holding that judgment creditors were not third-party beneficiaries of the
insured's cause of action against the insurer, that there could be no cause of
action against the insurer based on strict liability, and that the failure of the
insured to bring an action against the insurer was not actionable.
II. LIFE, HEALTH, AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Beneficiaries. As in the previous Survey, several cases dealt with ben-
eficiary designations and the procedural requirements for change of ben-
eficiaries. The vested, equitable interest in policy proceeds of "irrevoc-
able" beneficiaries designated under a court-approved property settlement,
recognized last year in Box v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co.,38
was reaffirmed by the Fifth Circuit in Murphy v. Travelers Insurance Co.39
Murphy presents a fact situation practically identical to that in Box. Murphy
was divorced in 1968. In the property settlement agreement incorporated in a
California divorce decree, he agreed to name his children as "irrevocable"
beneficiaries of up to one-half of his group life insurance policy. Murphy did
not comply with those terms of the property settlement but instead, following
his remarriage, named his new wife as sole beneficiary of the policy proceeds.
The trial court in an interpleader action awarded the children the amount
specified in the divorce decree and property settlement. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed, finding the applicable Texas and California law in agreement in
recognizing a vested equitable interest in the policy proceeds on behalf of the
minor beneficiaries.
Dreesen v. Coleman4° involved the interest of an ex-wife in the proceeds of
her former husband's life insurance policies in which she was the named
beneficiary. Rebecca Dreesen and Coleman were married in 1973. In 1974
Coleman took out two policies insuring his life and naming his wife as
beneficiary. Rebecca and Coleman were divorced in 1974, but the cash value
of the two insurance policies was not partitioned in the divorce decree. Eight
days later Coleman died in an automobile accident. The trial court awarded
one-half of the proceeds to Rebecca and one-half to Coleman's estate. The
36. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, holding approved), states the rule that an insurer must exercise ordinary care and
prudence in deciding whether to accept an offer for settlement within policy limits.
37. 529 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
38. 526 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
Brin, supra note 7, at 204.
39. 534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976).
40. 531 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1977]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Texarkana court of civil appeals reversed and awarded Rebecca the entire
proceeds of the policies, noting that although the marriage was dissolved she
had an insurable interest in her ex-husband's life and no change of beneficiary
had been executed.
In Deveroex v. Nelson41 Nelson died intestate, leaving four life insurance
policies naming his wife as primary beneficiary. The wife, who had murdered
the insured, was precluded by article 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code4 2
from sharing the proceeds. Nelson left two children: Zan, his wife's un-
adopted son born out of wedlock, and Edwin, his natural son. Two of the
policies named Zan Nelson and all children born of the marriage as contingent
beneficiaries, a third policy named the child or children of the insured as
contingent beneficiaries, and the fourth policy named Zan as "son" and the
sole contingent beneficiary. Zan instituted a proceeding in heirship alleging
adoption by estoppel and obtained a favorable jury verdict. The trial court
awarded all proceeds of the four policies to be divided equally between Zan
and Edwin. The court of civil appeals reformed the judgment to award all the
proceeds of the fourth policy to Zan as sole contingent beneficiary. The Texas
Supreme Court granted writ of error to decide the effect of article 21.23 on the
disposition of insurance proceeds when a contingent beneficiary has been
named. Article 21.23 provides that upon the forfeiture of the wrongdoing
beneficiary of his interest in the life insurance proceeds, "the nearest relative
of the insured shall receive such insurance." Edwin, Nelson's natural child,
contended that the court of civil appeals erred in failing to distribute the
proceeds of the fourth policy to Nelson's nearest relative as the statute
directs. The supreme court, however, persuaded by the convincing logic of
the court of civil appeals that the language of article 21.23 does not suggest the
intention of the legislature to forfeit the rights of the guiltless beneficiary,
affirmed the judgment of the court of civil appeals, holding that the insurance
proceeds would be distributed to the nearest relative under article 21.23 only
if all of the beneficiaries, primary and contingent, were disqualified.
In Pena v. Salinas43 the decedent executed a will shortly before his death
which purported to change the named beneficiaries in three life insurance
policies owned by him. The proceeds of the policies were paid by the insurer
directly to the named beneficiaries. Pena's executor sued to require the
named beneficiaries to surrender all funds received by them under the
insurance policies, alleging that the deceased had changed the beneficiaries in
his will. Each of the policies required written notice to the insurer in order to
designate a new beneficiary. All parties moved for summary judgment. The
trial court granted defendants' motion and plaintiff appealed. The court of
civil appeals affirmed, holding that the insured had not "substantially com-
plied" with insurance company requirements for designation of a new
beneficiary under the policies by executing a new will. 44 Therefore, the
41. 529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975).
42. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1963).
43. 536 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
44. The court noted that this same question had been decided by the supreme court in
Creighton v. Barnes, 152 Tex. 309, 257 S.W.2d 101 (1953).
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designation of new beneficiaries of the life insurance policies was of no
effect.
Accidental Death. Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Heyward45 in-
volved a claim for accidental death benefits under a group life policy. The
insured died of multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by unknown assailants. At
the time of his death the decedent was insured under a group life policy with
an accidental death rider naming his wife Velma as beneficiary. The acciden-
tal death rider provided coverage for death "effected solely through external,
violent and accidental means" and excluded coverage where death resulted
from self-inflicted injury or from "participation in or as the result of the
commission of a felonious act."46 Plaintiff, as named beneficiary under the
policy issued by Republic, sued to recover accidental death benefits payable
under the policy. At trial plaintiff introduced evidence of the insured's death
at the hands of unknown assailants and of the insured's good moral character.
The trial court instructed verdict for Republic at the close of plaintiff's
evidence. Plaintiff appealed, contending that she had introduced sufficient
evidence coupled with presumptions recognized by law to support her claim.
Republic contended that plaintiff had failed to raise a fact issue as to death
solely by "accidental means" and further, that the policy exclusion preclud-
ing coverage where a contributing cause of the loss is "participation in or as a
result of the commission of a felonious act" applied because the insured's
death was the result of a felonious assault. The court of civil appeals agreed
with plaintiff and reversed and remanded, holding that plaintiff, by showing
that the insured was killed by another, had raised a presumption that death
was accidental, making out a case under the policy. The court further held
that the fact that the insured was murdered by another did not bar recovery
since there was no evidence that at the time of his death the insured was
himself participating in or committing a felonious act. The court found that
whether a killing is accidental within the terms of an insurance policy is
properly determined from the viewpoint of the insured and not from the
viewpoint of the one who did the killing. 47 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed
the court of civil appeals, examining in a lengthy opinion the insurer's
contention that the above test was inapplicable where the policy covers death
"by accidental means" rather than "accidental death." The court concluded
that no meaningful distinction existed between the two terms and, therefore,
injuries are "accidental" if "the injury could not reasonably be anticipated by
the insured, or would not ordinarily follow from the action or occurrence
which caused the injury.-41 Applying this test,the court concluded that the
plaintiff had raised a fact issue as to whether the insured's death was
accidental. Therefore, the trial court's instructed verdict was improper.
45. 536 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1976).
46. Id. at 551.
47. This test for accidental death was approved by the Texas Supreme Court in Releford v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 228, 276 S.W.2d 517 (1955).
48. 536 S.W.2d at 557.
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Two cases dealt with the distinction between drowning and suffocation in
accidental death policies. In De La Cruz v. Combined American Insurance
Co. ,'9 an insured infant suffocated when dirt thrown by other children got
into her nose and mouth. The accidental death policy insured against acciden-
tal death resulting solely from accidents listed in the insurance policy and
listed "drowning" but did not mention suffocation. The father-beneficiary
brought suit contending that his child had died by "drowning" within the
meaning of the policy. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
insurer and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that the words
"drowning" and "suffocation" are not defined or understood by the public to
have the same general meaning and that drowning is generally accepted as
meaning to deprive of life by immersion in water or other liquid. In Investors
Life Insurance Co. v. Utrecht50 the Dallas court of civil appeals agreed with
the court in De La Cruz and held that a policy exclusion for "suffocation,
strangulation, or smothering" in an accidental death rider did not exclude
death by drowning.
Persons Insured. Zepeda v. American National Insurance Co.51 involved
the term "covered child" under a family life insurance policy. In 1968
plaintiff Gregorio Zepeda purchased a family life policy from American
National naming himself as the "insured" and his wife Maria Elena as
"insured spouse." The policy was payable on his death, the death of the
"insured spouse," and on the death of "each covered child." Two children
were born of the marriage and were covered under the policy. In 1969 plaintiff
divorced Maria Elena and remarried. Two children were born of the second
marriage and in 1972 one of the children of this second marriage died. The
policy had never been changed to substitute plaintiff's second wife, Con-
suelo, as "insured spouse." "Covered child," with respect to coverage of
children born after the policy date, was defined as "a child born to the Insured
and Insured Spouse after the effective date of this Policy" or a "child legally
adopted by the Insured after the effective date of this Policy." Plaintiff
argued that this definition of covered child merely described the outer limits
of coverage and that "covered child" necessarily included any child of the
insured since it expressly included adopted children. The court of civil
appeals, affirming the trial court's judgment for the insurer, held that the term
"covered child" was not ambiguous and plainly limited coverage of children
born after the policy date to children of the insured and insured spouse or
adopted children of the insured. Since the deceased child was not within one
of these express categories, it was not a covered child under the policy.
Group Health Insurance. Two cases dealt with coverage questions under
group health policies. Coker v. Travelers Insurance Co. 52 was concerned with
the term "eligible under Medicare." Plaintiff was insured under "Plan C" of
49. 527 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50. 536 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
51. 527 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
52. 533 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
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a group health policy, which was available only to persons under sixty-five
years of age. "Plan D" of the policy provided substantially reduced benefits
and was designed specifically for persons over sixty-five. While plaintiff's
policy was in force, the master policy was amended to limit persons "eligible
under Medicare" to Plan D benefits. Plaintiff, while still under sixty-five,
asserted a claim under Plan C of the policy for medical expenses incurred as
the result of a total hip displacement. Ten days prior to her operation for the
injury plaintiff became eligible for Social Security health benefits for the
disabled. The insurer denied coverage, contending that plaintiff was a person
"eligible under Medicare" and thus limited to Plan D benefits. Plaintiff
contended that she was covered under Plan C because the definition in the
master policy limited "Medicare" to benefits payable to persons over sixty-
five. In entering judgment for the insurer the trial court construed plaintiff as
a person "eligible under Medicare" and therefore restricted to Plan D
benefits. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered on the issue of
liability, holding that the term "persons eligible under Medicare" was am-
biguous in that it was unclear whether the term referred exclusively to
persons over sixty-five or included disabled persons under sixty-five who
were eligible for Social Security health benefits.
In Stanush v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 51 the insured made a claim for the
cost of an artificial leg under a group health policy which had terminated. The
court of civil appeals held that the claim was within the coverage of the policy
since the injury and amputation of the insured's leg occurred while the group
health policy was still in effect.
Article 21.23. Article 21.23 of the Texas Insurance Code 54 was applied in
two cases during the reporting period. In Deveroex v. Nelson, 5 previously
discussed, the statute was held not to extend to the innocent beneficiary, thus
bringing the statutory distribution of the life insurance proceeds to the nearest
relative of the insured into play only if all of the beneficiaries, primary and
contingent, are first disqualified. In Hair v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co. 5 6
the court of civil appeals held that an adjudication of the insanity of the
murdering spouse in a criminal proceeding did not bar as a matter of law the
application of the forfeiture provisions of article 21.23 in a later civil
proceeding.
III. FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
Insured Risks. Several cases during the reporting period examined fire and
casualty policy terms to determine which risks were included and which were
excluded from policy coverage. Lambros v. Standard Fire Insurance Co."
involved the coverage of a standard "all risks" homeowner's policy which
included for an additional premium the deletion of a policy exception for loss
53. 538 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
54. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.23 (Vernon 1963).
55. 529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. 1975); see note 41 supra and accompanying text.
56. 533 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. 530 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ granted).
1977]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
caused by underground water. Plaintiff's home was damaged by underground
water which caused the foundation of the home to settle and crack. Exclusion
K of the policy, different from the deleted exception, excepted coverage for
loss caused by "settling, cracking, bulging, shrinkage, or expansion of
foundations, walls, floors, ceilings, roof structures," except for "ensuing
loss caused by collapse of building, . . . water damage." '58 Plaintiff con-
tended that exclusion K was inapplicable to loss caused by underground
water in view of the deletion of the policy exception and, alternatively, that
this was an "ensuing loss" caused by partial collapse of the building or water
damage. The trial court rendered judgment n.o.v. for the insurer and the court
of civil appeals affirmed, holding that the deleted policy exception did not
render exclusion K ineffective and that "ensuing loss caused by water
damage" pertained to water damage which was the result, not the cause, of
the settling of the home's foundation and that as a matter of law there was
insufficient evidence of a partial collapse where there had been no finding that
the building was unfit for habitation.5 9
Jackson v. National Flood Insurers Association involved the construction
of certain terms in a flood insurance policy issued under the National Flood
Insurance Act of 1968. The policy insured against flood damage to the
"dwelling" including "additions in contact therewith." Plaintiff's elevated
beach house was insured under the policy and suffered damage when flood
waters from Hurricane Fern washed away much of the earth fill supporting a
concrete slab underneath the beach house. The slab extended a few feet
beyond the house and surrounded the concrete pylons on which the house
was built and functioned as a ground floor. The federal district court held that
the terms "dwelling" and "addition" necessarily included the concrete slab
beneath and adjacent to the beach house in light of the nature of the structure;
thus, the insured could recover.
Garfield Mutual Fire & Storm Insurance Association v. Calhoun 6l involved
the proof of a "hostile fire" in a standard fire policy. Plaintiff's house was
partially damaged by a fire and resulting explosion. The fire policy covering
the dwelling insured against fire, but not explosion. Accordingly, plaintiff
was required to show that the explosion was.a direct result of an antecedent
"hostile fire" on the premises. 62 At trial plaintiff introduced no direct
evidence of the cause of the fire but did introduce evidence of charred and
burned wood under the house. Following denial of the insurer's motion for
instructed verdict, the trial court entered judgment for plaintiff and the
insurer appealed. The court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that although
58. Id. at 139.
59. Id. at 142. The court considered determinative the supreme court's definition of partial
collapse as stated in Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 361 S.W.2d 704, 709 (Tex. 1962).
60. 398 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
61. 532 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
62. The court noted the general rule of insurance law that the insurer is not liable for the
consequences of a fire which burns in a place where it ought to be "friendly fire"; where a
friendly fire escapes from a place where it ought to be, however, and damage results, such fire
becomes a "hostile fire" for which the insurer is liable. Id. at 666.
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the burden was on the insured to show that a "hostile fire" was the cause of
the explosion in order to recover, sufficient evidence had been introduced to
raise a fact issue, thereby precluding an instructed verdict.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London6 3 involved the
question of when an oil well was "brought under control" under the terms of
an "all-risk" policy insuring against oil well blow-outs. Atlantic Richfield
sued the underwriters of a policy protecting the oil company against oil well
blow-outs for losses incurred in bringing under control a blow-out which
occurred in 1970 on "Stormdrill III," an offshore drilling platform off the
Texas coast. The insurer admitted coverage as to losses incurred in regaining
control of the well-head, but denied coverage as to damage and expenses
incurred in combatting the blow-out, which, by policy definition lasted only
as long as normal activities could not be conducted at the hole. Essentially the
insurers contended that the well was "brought under control" when blow-
out-fed fires were extinguished through a fortuitous "down-hole bridging
over" of pressure. Atlantic Richfield contended that the well was not
"brought under control" until measures were completed that prevented
recurrent blow-outs and permitted the resumption of normal operation at the
well-head. In interpreting the relevant policy provisions, the federal district
court considered the terms "out of control" and "blowout" as terms of art
within the oil industry and, influenced by other decisions' in the Fifth Circuit
considering the same question, granted summary judgment for the insured.
The court held that as a matter of law the blow-out was not "brought under
control" within the meaning of the policy until the well was finally plugged.
Policy Exclusions. In Casey v. Employers National Insurance Co. 65 plaintiff,
a plumbing subcontractor, sought to recover under a construction liability
policy for losses suffered when a waterpipe broke in a building under
construction. The policy contained an endorsement excepting coverage for
"Completed Operations Hazards." At the time of the loss the area of the
building in which the loss occurred had already been accepted and was being
used by the lessee although the building was only seventy-five percent
completed. The trial court granted judgment for the insurer and the court of
civil appeals affirmed, holding that since the damaged portion of the building
had been accepted by the owner, the loss was clearly excluded by the
language of the exclusionary clause.
Duty to Defend. In Fort Worth Lloyds v. Garza66 the insurer brought a
declaratory judgment seeking to determine whether it had the duty to defend
under a standard homeowner's policy. The insured had been sued by a third
party for injuries sustained while starting an irrigation pump on land owned by
63. 398 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Tex. 1975).
64. The court noted that this precise issue was considered by the Fifth Circuit in Sutton
Drilling Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 335 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1964); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v.
Dyer, 220 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1955); Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Means, 186 F.2d 783(5th Cir. 1951).
No Texas court had dealt with this issue. 398 F. Supp. at 709 n.1.
65. 538 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
66. 527 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the insured. Under the policy the insurer was contractually bound to defend
the insured in any lawsuit brought against the insured alleging bodily injury or
property damage in connection with the premises. "Premises" was defined to
include vacant land other than farm land. The insurer contended that as a
matter of law the land in question was not vacant because of the presence of
an irrigation pump on it; therefore, there was no possible coverage and no
duty to defend. The court of civil appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial
court for the insured, holding that although there was some question whether
tae land was "vacant land" for which coverage was provided, under the rule
that in determining whether a duty to defend exists all doubts regarding
coverage are to be resolved in favor of the insured, such doubt would be
resolved in the insured's favor.
Waiver. The issue of waiver by the insurer of an asserted policy defense was
involved in several cases. In Fort Worth Lloyds v. Purcell67 the failure of the
insurer to plead policy exceptions affirmatively prior to trial was held to be a
waiver of its right to rely on such exceptions. In Hanover Insurance Co. v.
Hagler,' involving a claim under a policy insuring against "vandalism and
malicious mischief," the insurer's payment of an uncontroverted claim for
damage to the insured's building, standing alone, was held to be insufficient
evidence of waiver by the insurer of a policy requirement for filing proof of
personal property loss within ninety-one days.
The actions of the insurer were held sufficient to waive the proof of loss
requirement in Jackson v. National Flood Insurers Association69 where the
insured had made a conscious effort to file his claim, requesting that he be
informed if any additional information was needed. Although the court held
that mere silence on the insurer's part would not constitute a waiver of the
proof of loss requirement, the actions of the insurer's agent in telling the
insured what information to provide in connection with his claim and his
representation that the claim would be considered were held to constitute a
waiver of the proof of loss requirement.
Venue. In Houston GeneralLloyds Insurance Co. v. Stricklin70 the mortgagee
of property damaged by fire asserted that venue was proper in the county in
which the property was situated. The insurer contended that since plaintiff
was not the policyholder or a beneficiary under the policy, venue under
subdivision 2811 was improper. The trial court overruled the defendant's plea
of privilege and the court of civil appeals affirmed, holding that under
subdivision 28 the plaintiff has only a two-point burden: (1) it must show that
the company is a fire, marine, or inland marine insurance company, and (2) it
must show that the insured property is located in the county where suit was
filed. There is no requirement that plaintiff prove that it was the policyholder
or beneficiary under the policy. In Southern County Mutual Insurance Co. v.
67. 529 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. 532 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. 398 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1974); see note 60 supra and accompanying text.
70. 538 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ dism'd).
71. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 28 (Vernon 1964).
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Smith72 the insured under a fire policy sought to maintain venue in the county
of the policyholder's residence. The court of civil appeals, in granting the
insurer's plea of privilege, held that venue against a fire insurance company is
limited to the county of the defendant's residence or the county where the
property is situated.
72. 529 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
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